Performance of the LHC magnet system by Parma, V & Rossi, L
PERFORMANCE OF THE LHC MAGNET SYSTEM 
V. Parma, L. Rossi, CERN, Geneva 23, 1211 Switzerland
Abstract 
The LHC magnet system, essentially composed of 
superconducting magnets operating at 1.9 K, has been 
largely commissioned in 2007-08. Before the serious 
incident of 19th September 2008, the magnet system was 
commissioned up to 7 kA (4 TeV proton beam energy); 
six (out of eight) sectors were commissioned up to 
5.5 TeV and one up to 6.6 TeV. For more than one week, 
both beams have been injected, circulated and captured in 
the RF bucket, thus assessing the optics at injection 
energy. The incident in sector 3-4, originated by a serious 
defect of a high-current joint between magnets with large 
collateral damage, has changed the plans: 53 magnets in 
the damaged zone have been substituted or repaired 
meanwhile a campaign of consolidation is under way to 
allow safe restart of the accelerator in fall 2009.  
All these points and other issues presented and 
discussed, with emphasis on the incident in sector 3-4.  
INTRODUCTION 
The LHC magnet system is composed by some 10,000 
superconducting magnets of various size and energy and 
by 154 resistive magnets. The complete system is 
described elsewhere [1] and we refer to Table 1 for a 
comprehensive list of the superconducting magnets.  
 






MB 1232 2 Main dipoles 
MQ 392 2 Arc quadrupoles  
MBX/MBR 16 1 Separation & 
recombination dipoles 
MSCB 376 2 Combined chromaticity 
& closed orbit correctors 
MCS 2464 1 Sextupole correctors for 
persistent currents at 
injection 
MCDO 1232 1 Octupole/decapole 
correctors for persistent 
currents at injection 
MO 336 1 Landau damping 
octupoles  
MQT/MQTL 248 1 Tuning quadrupoles  
MCB 190 1 Orbit correction dipoles 
MQM 86 2 Dispersion suppressor & 
matching section 
quadrupoles  
MQY 24 2 Enlarged-aperture 
quadrupoles in insertions 
MQX 32 1 Low-beta insertion 
quadrupoles  
 
It is noteworthy that two important choices serve to 
characterize the LHC magnet system: 
• The nominal field in the main dipoles, 8.3 tesla, is 
much higher than that of previous superconducting 
accelerators, (where the field is between 3 to 5 tesla). 
This required the use of superfluid helium, at 1.9 K, 
to boost the performance of the superconductors. 
• The adoption of the so-called “Two-in-One” concept, 
where two magnets around the beam tubes are 
located in the same cold mass. For the dipoles the 
“Twin” design was chosen, where the two magnets 
are magnetically and mechanically coupled. 
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 
The design and construction of the magnet systems has 
been reported in previous papers [2-4]. Here we recall the 
major steps in the construction of the magnet system: 
1. Production of the superconducting cables: from 
1999 to 2005 
2. Production of the main magnets: from 2000 to 
November 2006 
3. End of cold test: March 2007 
4. Preparation and installation of magnets in the 
tunnel: from March 2005 to March 2007 
5. Interconnection and associated works: from July 
2005 to October 2007 
6. Commissioning of the magnet system: from May 
2007 to September 2008 
The actual times employed for construction, assembly 
in the cryostats, preparation and installation of the main 
dipoles, are summarized in “Dashboard” format  in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1: Dashboard for the of LHC dipoles. 
The test and measurement activity did not follow the 
ramp up in dipole production in 2003/04, so a review was 
held at the end of 2003 to consider how to speed up. The 
modified cold testing procedures entailed the following: 
• Reducing magnetic measurement down to 10-15% of 
the total number. The uniformity of cable production 
(important for dynamic and persistent current effects) 
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and the good correlation cold-to-warm for geometric 
effect (in industry all magnets were measured warm) 
enabled this reduction without hampering the 
knowledge of the magnetic field. 
• Reducing the acceptance test in term of quench 
behaviour: magnet were no longer systematically 
pushed to 9 T, but accepted with 2 quenches to go 
above 8.4 T (8.3 being the nominal value) in 2004, 
which was modified to 3 quenches to get above 8.6 T 
from 2005 on.  
• Skipping some electrical measurements like splices 
that are inside the magnets. In reality this was not 
clear at the time but was revealed after the incident 
of 19 September 2008. Splices were found to be 
always very good at beginning of production, below 
sensitivity threshold with one doubtful exception 
(duly returned to the manufacturer for repair). The 
internal splices are covered by the QDS (quench 
detection system), so probably it was not considered 
to be a risk. This later turned out to be not the case. 
These new procedures helped to catch up with the delay 
in cold testing. The quench performance of the main 
dipoles was very good, with only 12% of dipoles 
requiring to be tested with a thermal cycle: based on this a 
maximum number of 200 quenches were estimated to be 
necessary in the machine to enable 7 TeV operation [5].  
In total 24 main dipoles were returned to the 
manufactures for repair: 12 for electrical faults (mainly 
quench heater problems); 10 for quench performance; one 
for mechanical reasons; one for a bad SC cable. In 2004 it 
was decided to manufacture 30 additional spare dipoles 
and in total we had 44 dipoles in reserve, 3.6% of the total 
installed number (the available dipoles at the moment of 
the incident were 40). The same percentage or more of 
reserve units was retained for the other magnets, with a 
few exceptions (MQ: 13 cold masses not “cryostated”). 
The assembly of magnets in their cryostats as well as cold 
test and preparation was entirely carried out at CERN in a 
factory-style activity involving more than 250 people 
between CERN personnel, associates and external 




The start of installation was strongly delayed by a 
technical problem with the installation of the cryogenic 
line (QRL), since the magnets can be installed only after 
complete installation of the QRL in a sector. While the 
installation of the QRL in the eighth and last LHC sector 
was delayed by about 10 months, the first sector was 
made available for magnet transport only 18 months later 
than the scheduled date. This provided more time for the 
other systems - including the magnet system.  However, 
the big effort on the cryogenic line did absorb resources 
and attention from the rest of CERN and deflected 
attention from some other critical issues, such as the 
preparation of interconnection work. Moreover, the delay 
in the start of the magnet installation called for a huge 
installation rate, peaking at more than 100 large magnets 
per months (against a nominal of 50),  forcing to increase 
the corresponding rate of magnet preparation, which in 
turn required a increased technical and logistic effort. The  
industry-supplied cold mass is itself the most complicated 
component, but many difficult operations had also to be 
carried at CERN in order to convert the bare cold masses 
into complete cryo-magnets ready to be installed. The 
long delay of the magnet installation due to the QRL 
problem was such that at a certain point about 1000 large 
magnets had to be stored outside, many of them for a 
period of 1-2 years (in the worst case 1200 days). 
Interconnections 
The interconnection (IC) work and results have been 
described in several papers [10-12]. Here we wish to 
recall that the IC is a very complex operation with many 
steps that have to be sequential over various unit lengths 
(magnetic cells, cryogenic subsector and vacuum 
subsector: each one with different length). The main 
technologies, all automatic, are i) the soft soldering 
employed to connect the high current (6-13 kA) 
superconducting cables in the magnet bus bars; ii) 
ultrasonic welding to connect with neither solder nor flux 
the small (600 A) superconducting cables of the corrector 
magnets; the TIG welding of austenitic steel of the 
various connections and bellows for the vacuum, bus bars 
and cryogenic lines. 
As in the case of magnet preparation and installation, 
the IC work had to speed up to recover part of the initial 
delay. At the peak more than 100 persons employed by 
the main contractor were executing series work in the 
tunnel, complemented by about 20 persons from CERN 
for special actions, and about another 120 persons from 
CERN and collaborating Institutes to carry out various 
checks and tests foreseen in the QA plan. At the peak, we 
worked in parallel in six of the total of eight sectors of the 
LHC, covering a length of more than 20 km. The last IC 
in the arc was made in November 2007; a few ICs in the 
interaction region (IR) were finished in April 2008, 
because of delays due to having to solve problems with 
the inner triplet quadrupole systems (buckling of the heat 
exchanger tubes and, later, also of the longitudinal 
support during pressure test). 
The IC work went extremely well despite the great 
pressure to get it done: the leak rate in the TIG welds was 
around 0.4% and the number of soldering joints that had 
to be re-done was at the 0.1% level. The electric QA 
intercepted also 0.1% defective ultrasonic welds of the 
600 A bus bars. However, one of the main QA pieces of 
equipment for checking the quality of the 13 kA splice, 
based on ultrasonic inspection, was not really operational 
until almost the end of the work: only the last sector was 
inspected with good coverage (80%), with one defective 
solder joint found and repaired. 
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MAGNET COMMISSIONING  
General hardware commissioning (HWC) of the 
magnet system and the machine is covered by other 
papers [13-18]. The sequence is quite complex given the 
number of circuits and complexity of powering 
operations. It is recalled that HWC was also strongly 
delayed in its start by the late availability of QRL and of 
the electrical distribution feed boxes. Despite this, in a 
very short time, basically one year, almost all 11,000 
circuits were commissioned. The success of the first 
beams day, 10th of September 2008, demonstrated the 
very good field quality and geometry of the magnets [19], 
their precise alignment and very good stability, the 
accuracy of the power supply and the successful operation 
of the highly complex 1.9 K cryogenic system. The 
thermal performance of the magnet cryostats was even 
better than specified. 
Problems and Repair or Consolidation 
Required 
A lot of small but annoying problems had to be fixed 
but were left for after the 2008 run. The main problems 
concerning the magnet behaviour were: 
• Symmetric quenches. The QDS was working only on 
differential voltage between the apertures of the 
same dipole magnet. In practice it was found that a 
quench in a dipole could trigger, perfectly symmetric 
quenches in adjacent dipoles at 7.5 kA, taking about 
650 ms instead of 50 ms to be revealed. This led to a 
requirement to limit the powering current to 8.6 kA 
before a new layer of QDS, able to detect such an 
event, was installed. 
• We had magnets that showed a different inductive 
voltage between the two apertures. This generated 
false quench signals during fast discharge. This was 
temporarily fixed, for the magnets concerned, by 
increasing the QDS voltage threshold from 100 to 
300 mV. 
• Some splices in the 6 kA line are made in hairpin or 
“praying hands” topology. These joints will likely 
suffer from fatigue effect after a few thousand 
cycles. The joints will be fixed later. 
• Almost all singly powered magnet circuits were 
plagued by problems with the helium level gauges. 
• A serious fault (lack of support against e.m. forces) 
in the assembly of the 13 kA bus bar inside the 
empty cryostats has to be fixed. 
During HWC there was not time to attend to these 
problems before beam commissioning. They are being 
cured in parallel with the extensive repair following the 
incident (see next section), except for the 6 kA joints that 
are less urgent and will be repaired after the 2010 run. 
Quench training 
Some types of magnets lost, partially or totally, the 
“memory” of the training done during acceptance testing 
at the surface. In particular the main dipoles, that in 
number and energy largely dominate the LHC hardware, 
were trained to high field in one sector only, up to 
6.6 TeV (or 7.9 tesla). By extrapolation from results of 
this sector to the entire machine we now estimate that a 
total of 800÷1000 quenches will be needed to enable the 
machine to run at 7 TeV, requiring from 2 to 4 months. At 
this moment we don’t know which parameter is 
generating this loss of memory, which seems to be more 
important for the dipoles from one of the three companies 
that produced them.. One possible explanation is the – 
unplanned – storage in the open air, for up to 3 years, 
which may have led to loss of pre-stress in the SC coils. 
As mentioned this behaviour is not limited to the main 
dipoles: some quadrupole and other dipole types 
apparently show the same phenomenon. Operation at 
6.5 TeV will require some 85 quenches of the main 
dipoles, which represents about 2 weeks of work. 
INCIDENT IN SECTOR 3-4 
Event 
On 19th September 2008 during a current ramp to 
9.3 kA (5.5 TeV proton energy) of the main dipoles in 
sector 3-4, an electrical fault occurred in a connection 
between adjacent magnets. This was the last ramp before 
definitive commissioning of the whole machine for 
operation at 8.6 kA, corresponding to an energy of 5 TeV.  
What was observed was a sudden increase of the 
voltage in the main dipole circuit such that the power 
supply could not deliver the required current and a fast 
de-ramp with energy discharge on the dumping system 
was initiated. The discharge, normally exponential with a 
time constant of 104s, was erratically faster indicating an 
abnormal loss of energy; soon after the start of discharge, 
the circuit was divided in two branches, clearly indicating 
the presence of a short circuit. Many magnets quenched 
and eventually helium was filling the tunnel and general 
power was lost in the sector 3-4 itself. 
At the first inspection in the tunnel, many magnets, 
around the two where the defect originated, were found 
displaced and the interconnection bellows heavily 
damaged. In the damaged zone (D-zone), primarily 
defined where the insulation vacuum was lost, and about 
750 m in length, spanning from magnet Q19 to magnet 
Q33, considerable mechanical damage had occurred in 
the magnet connections, electrical faults (all induced by 
mechanical displacement, except the first), perforation of 
the helium vessel, local destruction of beam tube with 
heavy  pollution by debris from the electric arc and from 
fragments of multi-layer insulation (MLI), breakage or 
damage of cold support posts, breach in the 
interconnection bellows and damage of the warm support 
jack sustaining the magnets, and  cracks of the tunnel 
floor. The pollution of the beam tubes was much more 
extended than the D-zone, spanning along the whole arc. 
The report of a task force, chaired by Ph. Lebrun (CERN), 
set up to analyze the incident and propose possible 
remedies, is available in [20].  
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Cause and Analysis 
The dipole circuit interconnection had a defective joint 
between superconducting cables. A schematic of the 
13 kA interconnection is shown in Fig. 2. The technology 
is soft soldering based on tin-silver alloy, used both to 
splice the superconducting cable and to connect the 
copper stabilizer to the cable joint and to the stabilizing 
copper of the bus bar. When finished the connection looks 
like a perfect reconstitution of the bus bars system that 
run along the whole length of the magnet system.  
 
Figure 2: Schematic of a 13 kA connection.  
The splice between superconducting cables is specified 
to be below 0.6 nΩ and the actual results on sample 
witness showed an average of 0.2 nΩ with a variance of 
less than 0.1 Ω. The one that failed was later evaluated to 
be around 220 nΩ. Unfortunately the quench detection 
system of the bus bar was not sensitive enough to detect 
the ∼ 2 mV voltage of the resistive zone, its protection 
being ensured for the entire length of the bus and 
correspondingly set to a 1 V threshold. 
It was found that data of temperature sensors placed in 
the magnet indicated, during the plateau of current at 
7 kA done in the previous days, a small but very clear 
temperature gradient with a difference of up to 40 mK - a 
clear sign of the existence of an abnormal dissipation of 
10.7 ± 2.1 W, corresponding to a resistance of 
180÷260 nΩ. A thermo-electrical model was then able to 
simulate a thermal runaway of the normal zone in the 
splice at 8.7 kA, by making the hypothesis of a resistance 
of 220 nΩ and no contact between cable and stabilizer at 
the joint and also of a longitudinal gap in the stabilizer. 
This discontinuity is very important as it impedes current 
sharing among cable and stabilizer. The time constant of 
the current decay in the bus bar is 104 s, while the copper 
of the cable is sized to withstand in resistive state a 
discharge time of 1 s, (what we have in a single magnet). 
If the above mentioned conditions are present together, 
the joint cannot sustain the discharge and melts away. 
A longitudinal gap, either total or partial, were reported 
to be not infrequent in the interconnection works, so a 
very bad splice is likely to be without protection. 
Collateral Damages 
Bad as it was the incident would have heavily damaged 
two magnets “only” (and polluted a large fraction of the 
beam tube) if heavy collateral damage would not have 
occurred. The power dissipated in the electric arc was 
sufficient to destroy the cryogenic envelope of the line 
enclosing the faulty connection with massive inlet of 
liquid helium into the vacuum envelope; the two beam 
vacuum tubes were also vaporized. The helium flooded 
into the vacuum enveloped at an average rate of 13 kg/s 
with a peak of 20 kg/s, which is a value ten times higher 
than the one considered for the sizing of the relief valves 
of the vacuum vessel. In addition the helium was 
violently heated by the power of the arc (2÷6 MW). As a 
result the pressure rose suddenly to 8 bar, well beyond the 
1.5 bar absolute for which the system was designed, 
causing a longitudinal force to build up on the insulation 
vacuum barriers housed in the quadrupoles cryostats. 
Three of these units broke their external supporting jack 
fixations to ground and moved up to 500 mm, pulling or 
pushing the adjacent dipoles (30 tonnes each) that were 
moved one by one in a kind of domino-effect. These large 
movements destroyed or heavily deformed both 
interconnections and bus bars, generating secondary arcs, 
which in turn contributed to further helium discharge 
inside the vacuum vessel and in the beam tube, increasing 
the pollution. The 8 bar pressure and the push-pull 
movement severely damaged the large bellow providing 
the vacuum enclosure around the interconnection and 
helium was discharged into the tunnel.  
As a summary we can state that: 
• 53 magnets, 39 dipoles and 14 quadrupoles, were 
removed from the tunnel: 30 dipoles and 7 
quadrupoles were damaged or suspected to be 
damaged and replaced by spares, while 16 (9 dipoles 
and 7 quadrupoles) were re-used after minor or no 
intervention. Some of these 16 units were removed 
as a precaution, being near to damaged material.. 
• 9 interconnections suffered damage. due to arcs. 
• 26 magnets were displaced longitudinally (either the 
whole cryostat, together with the cold mass inside,  
or the cold mass with respect to the cryostat) 
• Of the 600 MJ of stored energy, about 30% was 
discharged in the dump resistor, 24% was dissipated 
as heat inside the quenched magnets (eventually 104 
of the 154 series connected dipoles did quench) and 
46% was lost in the various arcs and electrical faults 
(i.e. sufficient energy  to melt 375 kg of copper). 
• 6 tonnes of helium were lost in the tunnel, and 
eventually to the atmosphere, out of the initial 
inventory of 15 tonnes for the sector. 
• The two beam vacuum tubes were polluted with MLI 
for the 2.8 km of length of the arc; a little less than 
1 km also contained debris coming from molten 
copper and insulation and, required strong cleaning. 
Remedies or Mitigation Measures 
The remedies taken have been: 
• Implementation of a new QDS on the bus bars and 
interconnection line, with a sensitivity threshold of 
0.3 mV. In steady state, a 10 μV sensitivity level is 
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possible, enabling to detect a bad splice with R > 
10 nΩ, well below the runaway threshold, now 
estimated to be beyond 50 nΩ. The new QDS will 
also detect symmetric quenches. The present magnet 
QDS will be used in such a way as to also detect bad 
splices inside magnets: it has been found that three 
magnets, (two in the LHC and 1 in reserve), have 
defective internal splices of 100, 50 and 25 nΩ. In 
the first and third cases, it was confirmed on opening 
that such a high value of splice resistance is due to 
absence of solder. As we could only test half of the 
machine we can expect to detect more cases when 
the LHC is cooled down. Internal splices are covered 
by the QDS and protected by the bypass diode.  
• The cryostats of the dipoles that were warmed up 
(half LHC) have been equipped with new 200 mm 
ports for evacuation of helium. This should keep the 
pressure well below 1.5 bar absolute even in case of 
a helium loss rate of 40 kg/s, twice that of the 
incident in 3-4 and taken now as new maximum 
credible incident (MCI). The half LHC that has 
remained cold cannot yet be equipped with such new 
ports, but some existing ports on the quadrupoles 
have been equipped with additional low pressure 
relief devices. This measure will keep the pressure 
below 3 bar in case of a MCI. 
• As it is not possible to fully implement the remedies 
in half of the accelerator, we will run at up to 4 TeV 
per beam (slightly below 7 kA) for a certain period, 
and then possibly push the machine up to a 
maximum of 5 TeV (8.6 kA in the dipoles), in order 
to minimize damage in case of faults. Another 
mitigation measure is to reinforce the anchoring to 
ground by a factor 2 in all SSS with vacuum barrier: 
this should guarantee no movement of the SSS 
cryostats even at 3 bar absolute of pressure (making 
the reasonable hypothesis – to be tested – that the 
support posts withstand twice their nominal load).   
CONCLUSIONS 
The complex magnet system of LHC has been 
completed and was a key ingredient in the spectacular 
success of the first beam on 10th of September 2008. 
Unfortunately a fault in an electrical connection between 
magnets has made necessary a stop that will last more 
than one year, in order to repair the 750 m long damaged 
zone and carry out the necessary consolidation measures 
on the whole ring to assure electrical and mechanical 
protection of the magnets. Meanwhile, other required 
consolidation, revealed during hardware commissioning, 
is being carried out. The next run will be limited to 4 to 
5 TeV, because full mechanical consolidation cannot be 
completed without warming up the entire machine. Once 
this is done, the machine can operate, as concerns the 
magnet system, at up to 7 TeV, provided the necessary 
time of 3-4 months is allocated to train all the magnets. 
Operation at up to 6.5 TeV should be possible with 
virtually no need for additional training quenches.  
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